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This thesis reads a posthuman feminist ethos, as theorized by Rosi Braidotti, 
within Kathy Acker’s In Memoriam to Identity. By recognizing the posthuman 
undercurrent of the text, my argument cuts against the conventional postmodern 
arguments traditionally associated with Acker’s work. I emphasize the novel’s 
recuperation of the French feminist theory écriture féminine, a 20th century postmodern 
method of thinking that sought to embody and empower the “woman” in language. 
However, my position gives pause to simply recognizing the implications of the text’s 
postmodern conventions. If left to a postmodern reading, Acker’s text runs the risk of 
succumbing to language’s patriarchal consciousness. Coherence, as I argue, is directly 
linked to a patriarchy itself. By coupling a postmodern deconstruction and a posthuman 
understanding—one that prioritizes the living being—I articulate an “actual way out” for 
the marginalized subject. As a result, Acker’s nearly incoherent rhetoric, “non-identity” 
characters, and understanding of sexuality as beyond gender, all constitute a text that 
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Chapter 1  
A task that interested écriture féminine writers in the late twentieth century was 
finding the space to embody the female in language without relying on the male voice. 
They sought for a type of non-metaphorical language in hopes of empowering the 
woman—providing her with a mode of communication that was distinct from patriarchal 
logic. While these critics did not provide us with a specifically feminine language, they 
did give rise to a new way of thinking about dominant ideology, its oppressive 
implications and its relation to language. Writers such as Leslie W. Rabine, in “Écriture 
Féminine and Metaphor,” discuss language in this way. In her essay, she examines 
Hélène Cixous’ central contention that the basic structure of language, operating through 
a structure of dualist, hierarchal oppositions, is responsible for shaping thought, and “[is] 
that on which meaning depends” (Rabine 27).  Here, she points out the problematic 
makeup of Western languages; how, at their core, they exclude women, and function only 
through the incessant silence and repression of them.1 This very structure is inextricably 
patriarchal, and inevitably circumscribes the gender binary. So much so, that even if the 
woman tried to subvert language through metaphor for the purpose of escaping the “male 
voice” and patriarchal logic, she would end up in the same place as where she started.   
 Take for example, the conventional novel. What is required to produce a 
marketable, cohesive work of fiction is one in which its storyline is not only structurally 
 
1 While écriture féminine theory has indicated that oppression takes on multiple forms, my focus on 
language and linguistic coherence coincides with Kathy Acker’s own play with language. Obviously, 
subversive language alone will not undo centuries worth of systematic oppression that globally impacts the 
lives of women of color and transgender women. I acknowledge that marginalization is more than 
linguistic. But my choosing to underline language’s participation in their oppression connects to my 
overarching contention that language and consciousness is an inextricable human experience, and therefore 
is deserving of discursive elaboration.   
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sound and dramatically appealing, but also one in which its general way of 
communicating is clear. Écriture féminine writers sought to undermine the notion of 
clarity, for they found that at the root of coherence and order was a patriarchal 
consciousness. Hélène Cixous and other postmodern écriture writers saw the language 
within novel/narrative/text as a way to reveal the effects of subversion, and thus a useful 
tool for understanding the limitations of language and its inextricability from patriarchal 
logic.  However, the problem underlying this way of thinking is that it still functions in 
the male/female binary by attempting to lend credence to the female, inevitably 
essentializing gender and reversing the hierarchical structure. Perhaps missing in écriture 
féminine criticism was a thorough destabilization of language followed up with an 
actualizable call for action, one that doesn’t require patriarchal forms in order for it to be 
articulated. Indeed, écriture féminine’s own oversight reveals how deeply entrenched 
patriarchal logic is: when one acknowledges this logic, they are left with no sensible 
choice but to repurpose it.   
A theoretical lens that lances this endless trap of repurposing is posthumanism, a 
critical analysis of modernity that favors new possibilities and indeterminate logic. 
Posthumanism shifts our current fidelities from an anthropocentric ideology to an 
uncentered reality, one that evades hierarchical language and thought. The lens offers “a 
new epistemology not centered in Cartesian dualism,”2 and calls for a continuous renewal 
of power differentials to guide encounters among living beings. Deleuzian feminist 
philosopher Rosi Braidotti, in her text “Four Theses on Posthuman Feminism,” 
 
2 Bolter, Jay. (2016). Posthumanism. 10.1002/9781118766804.wbiect220.  
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champions a “posthuman vitalist feminism” which proposes an application of language 
that decouples from reason, universality, and humanism. Her essay deconstructs the   
intersection between feminism and posthumanism, effectively drawing attention to 
problematic, structured thought that naturalizes patriarchal spaces, and offering an 
alternative to oppressive systems at play by validating a type of relational ontology 
between identities.   
Kathy Acker’s novel In Memoriam to Identity offers its reader a material 
testament of posthuman ethics through its recuperation of écriture féminine theory. 
Although Acker had not known what posthumanism was at the point of writing, her book 
gives its reader a way of looking at posthumanism that situates a subversive 
consciousness that is rhizomatic, unstable, and uncomfortable, but nonetheless, a way out 
of a patriarchal consciousness. Acker’s work is traditionally understood as postmodern, 
for it tends to call for a deconstruction of the language at first glance. However, my 
reasons for not extending the postmodern argument on Acker’s text has to do with my 
discomfort in reducing Acker’s text to its material form. I can understand the inclination 
to do so. Acker’s language, after all, is not reader-friendly; postmodernism, which 
conventionally abides by the Derridean rule of thumb, “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte” or 
“There is no outside of the text,” provides the reader with a system of reading that sees 
only linguistic play in Acker’s work. However, to me, Acker’s novel engages in more 
than just language play – it prioritizes the human. Stefan Herbrechter reiterates this idea 
in his examinations of posthuman literature. In a keynote speech about posthuman 
literature’s seemingly contradictory position, he validates a deconstructive overlap 
between the postmodern and posthuman, but nonetheless distinguishes the outdatedness 
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of the former theory. He argues that postmodernism is “most urgent [with] the apocalypse 
of humanity” through its mixing of ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, intermediality and science 
into the novel, all the gradual embracing of hypertext and the advent of electronic 
literature. (5) Indeed, if Acker’s text is deconstructed through these understandings, a 
postmodern deconstruction would certainly make it more palatable to the reader. 
However, the consequence of doing this is significant, in that the theory itself slides over 
the content and by extension, the human itself. In defense of posthumanism, Herbrechter 
notes that:   
Posthumanism is [a] continuation of the poststructuralist critique of the prevalent 
humanism in literary criticism throughout most of the 20th century and the idea that 
literature and the study of it should be a defense of the human, or the nature and 
value of humanity, against the perceived scientific and economistic onslaught. (6)   
Here, Herbrechter recognizes posthumanism in its structuralist tendencies, but then saves 
the human by emphasizing the socio-historical boundaries of the human as its been 
measured up against scientific and technological change. Simply put, Herbrechter 
formalizes our posthumanism as a type of a post structuralism, one that is inherent within 
postmodernism, but nonetheless coupled with an understanding of technological 
advancements and the empathetic nature of humanity.   
If posthumanism is understood in this manner, postmodernism limits a discussion 
of Acker’s text because of the theory’s inclination to simply deconstruct or diagnose the 
binary opposition that exists within the language, Therefore, I opt for posthumanism as a 
way for this analysis, which prioritizes the human both in the way the text is meant to be 
read (form) and, in the content, too. Haphazard and furiously rhizomatic, In Memoriam 
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employs three narratives that intersect with each other: a reimagination of teenage and 
young adult Rimbaud’s (‘R’) life and relationship with Verlaine (‘V”), a parallel story to 
R’s and V’s about a girl named Airplane and her  relationship to her rapist; hypersexual 
Capitol, whose manic infatuations with her brother Quentin informs her desire to conquer 
men, and who practices the act of “forgetting” in order to destructively kill her multiple 
selves; and finally, “Wild Palms,” which retrospectively alternates between the narratives 
of Airplane and Capitol. In this analysis, I argue that Acker presents a posthuman 
approach to identity and gender politics within this novel and embraces Rosi Braidotti’s 
posthuman feminism in a way that actively prioritizes the human and undermines the 
male consciousness underlying linguistic coherence.   
Moreover, the text reveals its posthumanism in the way it disregards 
preconceptions of logic – operating through the conceptual as opposed to the actual.  In 
other words, posthuman ethics appear within this text through its consistent obliteration 
of rhetorical rules – even if only for a split second. Its success in doing so lies within its 
ability to both embody the essence of an “actual way out” and yet still undercut the kind 
of marginalized “space” that écriture féminine writers believed to be a solution to 
patriarchy. For example, the sentences in her novel, which I expand more on in the third 
section of this thesis, demonstrates a posthuman feminism – namely, in the tension 
between its grammatical sensibility and logical nonsense. The text is riddled in 
“sentences” that follow the basic rules of language: subject/predicate. But Acker’s 
sentences rarely mean anything clear, nor connect to another part of the “narrative” that 
would otherwise give them rhetorical purpose:   
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Over his vodka and beer, V, though he was still an alcoholic and had to be in control 
of all situations because he was weak, decided that it was necessary for him to leave 
his family and have adventures with R because he was imminently about to be 
arrested by the cops for collaborating with the Communists… Being a good  
Frenchman V had to protect his only child by abandoning him. (Acker 57)    
Is V’s leaving of his family predicated on his weakness or his alcoholism? What about 
being a good Frenchman prompts the protection of his child? More frustratingly, how 
does abandoning the child protect it? This denial of a sensible link between parts of the 
sentence, i.e. a pushing aside of coherence, demonstrates the text’s rhizomatic approach 
to language, and therefore its posthumanism. The conventional order of subject/verb, 
which sets the given action in the sentence to be dependent on the subject, inevitably 
circumscribes the subject itself. But by being ceaselessly hapless and wayward in 
organizing sentences, the novel prioritizes dismantling this logical structure. Acker’s way 
of tackling this is by constructing her characters as a non-identity. In the third section, I 
elaborate on the implications of this – how the narrative’s use of a characterlessness 
destabilizes subjectivity and breathes a posthuman agent into the novel. Inherently 
confusing, these methods deprivilege an equivocation of narrative as logical and 
organized to something that is only meaningful if we remember to salvage the 
marginalized subject that exists because of the incoherence.   
Furthermore, In Memoriam of Identity toys with fixed identity by complicating the 
dichotomy of “I’ and “Other,” thus doing away with the existence of a binary in identity 
construction. In place of the subject, an idea that usually relies on the metaphorical body, 
is a restructured identity that at first glance is non-characterizable. The character of 
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Rimbaud, for example, is sutured to an anachronistic reimaging of the real-life Rimbaud. 
The point of this construction, where the reader is unable to track the character either 
through the allusion or through a developmental plot, is to reveal the very existence of the 
marginalized figure in language. The notion of who exactly Rimbaud is becomes 
questionable, for his so-called character arc is replaced by a disjointed narrative. The 
subjectivity inherent within asking “Who” Rimbaud “is” becomes dismantled as a result, 
thus revealing a critique on subjectivity. Moreover, the very title of this novel suggests 
that identity, as a once living subject, has died, and so the book itself will serve as a 
reflection of (perhaps meditation on) identity that once was. Acker complicates our 
conceptions of the “I”, and answers back to the Butlerian proposition that, “When the ‘I’ 
seeks to give an account of itself, it can start with itself, but it will find that this self is 
already implicated in a social temporality that exceeds its own capacities for narration” 
(Butler 8). Indeed, in Judith Butler’s reading, the “I” cannot actually give an account of 
itself. In the form of the narrative, Acker successfully and paradoxically positions the 
subject within a narrative that is inherently anti-narrative. Because we don’t understand 
what happens “characters” like R, Acker wishes for us to reimagine language as averse to 
conservation of the past as the basis for a straightforward, logical chronology. Ultimately, 
through Acker’s precursive posthumanism, she recognizes that “[This] struggle with the 
unchosen conditions of one’s life, a struggle—an agency—is also made possible, 
paradoxically, by the persistence of this primary condition of unfreedom” (Butler 19). 
This understanding of subjectivity can still reveal an agency that does not rely on a binary 
in language nor implicate the individuals back into hierarchical thought. Therefore, the 
“characters” in Acker’s text are liberated from an anthropocentric model in the way that 
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they don’t really act like characters. They don’t need to really on structured meaning, 
linearity nor comprehension in order to be felt or understood. This model thus paves a 
way for understanding how the posthuman can exist in language.    
  The notion of “becoming” in posthuman logic can be looked at as a type of new 
humanity that serves as a navigational tool that helps in understanding the complexities of 
the present. It suggests that the chronology of life is constantly mutating into a number of 
contemporary discursive events. The idea of becoming, then, focuses primarily on the 
action of doing something, with open potential, without thinking it is completable. It does 
not rely on a recapitulation of the self, and therefore does not allow for capitalization of 
that potential. In that way, the act of “becoming” is transversal, as are the characters in 
Kathy Acker’s text. Although, yes, characters within stories are technically meant to 
parallel people and stand in for human subjectivity, Rimbaud, Verlaine and the like are 
meant to be metacognitively understood as an abstract stand-in for subjectivity. That is to 
say that because the characters are always depicted within an act of irrevocable 
suspension, of incompleteness, of nothing but a thing which does not require growth, they 
are opposing the conventions of selfhood as they often appear in literature. By doing this, 
Acker destabilizes character, and therefore destabilizes subjectivity.  
Finally, sexuality in Braidotti’s posthumanism recognizes itself as a living force 
beyond gender. In Braidotti’s posthumanism, sexuality itself is not reduced to the gender 
binary, and because posthumanism is zoe-centered, the body serves as a conduit of that 
life force. Sexuality, after all, “provides a nonessentialist ontology structure for the 
organization of human affectivity and desire” (Braidotti 36) and is grounded by the body 
itself. This makes gender a system which continually disciplines and punishes the body. 
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Posthumanism, then, looks for intensities beyond binaries and functions by an “and-and” 
logic as opposed to an “either-or”. In order to do this, the body must be seen as an 
incorporeal complex assemblage of “virtualities” that both understands that one is always 
sexed and encompasses sexuality as a constitutive element (37). The becoming-woman in 
posthumanism involves the evacuation of gendered identities of women and opens them 
to a “virtual multiplicity of chaosmic forces of becoming” (37).    
Reading the novel through Braidotti’s claims, I argue that the novel attempts to 
capture the indeterminate by becoming the indeterminate. The only way for the “woman” 
to survive in language is by doing away with the gender binary that keeps her in an 
oppositional spot to her traditionally empowered, male counterpart. A way to do this is 
not just in subversive or postmodern methods of thinking that considers language alone, 
but in a posthuman way of thinking that prioritizes the living being. In Memoriam is 
profuse with language that never seeks to be wholly understood because conventional 
language, or even critical theory, defines proper comprehensibility as inherently male. 
Acker, in writing with a posthuman agency vis-a-vis a type of rhizomatic language, 
encourages us to imagine a world is which systems are beyond the current understanding 
of the human condition—for the humanist ideal of man has resulted in oppressive power 
differentials. In remaining simultaneously open and contrarian, Acker has us critiquing 
oppressive system at play. But in playing as a posthuman agent, she argues for a 
disembodying and reimagining of these systems that prioritizes the safekeeping of life yet 
opposes the practice of pigeonholing through categories. In other words, the posthuman 
recuperates an underlying utopianism to her text, and thus language and thought 
themselves.  
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Chapter 2  
The following section examines Kathy Acker’s subversion of “character” in her 
novel In Memoriam to Identity, and how Rosi Braidotti’s arguments on posthuman 
feminism offer cause for an intervention into postmodern readings of Acker’s language. 
Postmodern readings, which tend to focus their analysis of Acker’s language play, 
suppress two key elements of Acker’s texts: her mutilation of character and her 
antinarrative design. In response, this section examines the theoretical, utopian overlap 
between Braidotti’s and Acker’s texts by first explaining how Braidotti’s posthumanism 
heslps clarify Acker’s indeterminate, rhizomatic language in the way it undermines 
Western subjectivity/identity and destabilization of the unified subject. As mentioned in 
the introduction, my stance differs from the postmodern view of her language in the sense 
that it considers both content and form within its analysis. But by conceptualizing a 
characterlessness, which takes on a “future ontological position whereby no other comes 
into existence” (Colby 61), Acker reveals how normative language is inherently 
gendered, oppressive, and contingent on hierarchy. Next, my argument dovetails 
Braidotti’s examination of zoe-centrality with Acker’s motifs of flesh and death, offering 
a vital neo-materialist approach to life. Lastly, my argument explores Braidotti’s 
contention of seeing sexuality as beyond gender through Acker’s own use of desire as an 
amorphous, uncategorizable force that begins with the body. When understood through 
Braidotti’s theory, utopianism returns to Acker via the posthuman lens; Acker’s 
mutilation of character and anti-narrative design within In Memoriam to Identity thereby 
reveals its aim to be staunch rebel against Western language.   
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Kathy Acker’s mutilation of the character in her novel overlaps with Rosi 
Braidotti’s posthumanism in that Acker’s text treats her “characters” as totally detached 
from a unified, narratable subjectivity, which undoes anthropocentric thinking in 
language. In her novel, Acker subverts the convention of using the character as a stand-in 
for the normative subject, for to do so would mean to subject her characters to an 
oppressive dualistic identity. In In Memoriam, Acker will construct her own characters as 
fragmented identities. That reading alone would make for a great postmodern analysis. 
But I will take that a step further and say that they’re not characters at all. Instead, they 
embody characterlessness that remains consistently indeterminate. Despite her characters 
being given names or other means of identification, Acker simply uses them as a 
navigational tool. We can understand this disconnect between character and subject 
through the way Acker approaches dialogue.3 Conventional fictional technique calls for a 
connection between character and their spoken dialogue. However, if we were to read 
that the posthuman consciousness runs through the novel, then I would argue an 
automatic disconnect between character and dialogue; character, as we know it, ceases to 
exist, thus rendering the possibility for the characters to stand mutually exclusive from a 
narrative milieu. What this allows for is a collapsing of character and diegesis and 
clarifies a destabilized consciousness that exists throughout.    
Nonetheless, Acker works within the margins of the novel/narrative structure in 
order to “systematize” the instability of the subject. To Acker, rhetorical coherence 
equates with stability in language, which thereby promotes reliance on the patriarchal 
logic. In Kathy Acker: Writing the Impossible, Georgina Colby discusses In Memoriam’s  
 
3 I elaborate on this further in the third section.   
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incessant undercutting of identity in her chapter concerning “non-identity,” or as she 
would call it, “constructive non-identity.” She specifically examines Airplane’s 
recollection of Rimbaud’s words: “I am an other.” (226).  In this statement, she argues 
that “the ‘I’ is objectified and gestures to self-alienation, whereby the self is alienated into 
the position of other within the binary ‘I’ and ‘other’” (161). Here, Colby discusses how 
the “I” becomes isolated and objectified, thereby disrupting the reader’s conventional 
dependency on the “I” and subjectivity. This dependency aligns with Judith Butler’s 
proposition on the “I,” in that this normative structure of the subject teaches the 
individual that there is a solid, conceivable way of giving account of oneself. Yet, as 
discussed in the previous section, the contrary is highly misleading. Acker sees through 
this inability to perfectly concretize a subjective narrative, and instead attempts to 
momentarily reconcile the fundamental disjunction between subject and narrative. This 
tactic is Acker attempting to purport the very Butlerian inability of talking about 
characters at all. According to Butler:   
… If the subject is opaque to itself, not fully translucent and knowable to itself, it is 
not thereby licensed to do what is wants or to ignore its obligations to others. The 
contrary is surely true. The opacity of the subject may be a consequence of its being 
conceived as a relational being, one whose early and primary relations are not 
always available to conscious knowledge. (19)   
Here, Butler discusses the limitations of subject formation theory – more specifically, 
how the opacity inherent within subject formation is directly related to its being 
conceived as a relational being. This Butler acknowledges the inevitability of a subject – 
after all, the subject plays and has played a role in constructing conscious thought.  
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Although the subject itself is inextricably linked to patriarchal consciousness, society 
cannot completely do away with their attachment to the subject. Instead, Butler calls for 
an ethics that comes from this understanding of subjectivity. Again, my argument stands 
that subject is an extension of patriarchal consciousness. In this way, I err towards 
Butler’s belief in the value of both the acknowledgement of how the subject still stands as 
a valuable and reliable platform for understanding social relations. Acker’s reimagining 
of the “I” through the subversive, posthuman subject in her own text sees the value in 
presenting subjectivity within her opaque subjects by constructing them as fluid and 
relational through elements of a narrative.   
  Braidotti’s contentions on flesh when seen through posthumanism, specifically in 
its zoe-centered sensibility which considers all forms of life at whatever organic 
biological stage it is in, is read through Acker’s own relationship to flesh and death. A 
post human understanding of flesh relates to Acker’s understanding of character in that 
both are destabilized and permeable. Conventionally, both have relied on a malecentered, 
patriarchal sensibility in order to give it structure and meaning. In In  
Memoriam, however, Acker debases the socially constructed understanding of both. 
Acker executes this posthuman read of death through her approach of abortion, a taboo 
practice, one in which maternal scripts are heavily weighted, and through which she is 
underscoring the natural process of life and death. She does this by eliminating any 
sentimentalized notions that are associated with this concept. The “The Wild Palms” 
section of In Memoriam features a chapter titled, “Abortions”. Tangentially, though 
abortions are mentioned in the chapter, the concept itself does not thematically anchor the 
chapter, once again producing a destabilizing effect on the reader. Instead, abortions are 
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simply approached through their efficiency. The narration speaks of the character 
Capitol’s attitude towards abortions, and analyzes the rules set up for the woman’s body 
by society: “When a woman’s body turns into a baby-wanting machine and if the woman 
doesn’t want a body, she has to wage war against herself. Her best girlfriend the same. 
Both of them had three abortions in one year” (Acker 248).  What’s missing here is the 
sentimentalizing of abortions that one would see in a conventional text, and what’s 
replaced it is the woman’s tumultuous task of augmenting the socially and biologically 
imposed pressure of motherhood. The blunt, matter of factual end to Capitol and her 
friend’s narrative of having three abortions, which followed powerful imagery of what 
the woman had to go through in order to outset societal judgement, underscores Acker’s 
acknowledgement of abortion as simply an elimination of the flesh. Most significantly, 
this imagery emphasizes the need to instead, highlight how the societal judgement 
emotionally effects the woman. Although the pain of the subject is a humanist move, I 
argue that this understanding of pain, in conjunction with the postmodern treatment of the 
sentence itself – after all, it’s bluntly tagged onto the end of the paragraph – helps us to 
understand how zoe-centered sensibility can be felt through narrative.   
Braidotti again embraces this understanding of death in her argument for the 
activist recognition of zoe, i.e. nonhuman life. She contends that within posthuman 
feminism, “The postanthropocentric turn goes a step further: by challenging 
anthropocentric habits of thought, it foregrounds the politics of the ‘naturalized’ 
nonhuman other and thus requires a more radical break down the assumption of human 
uniqueness” (Braidotti 30). Through a posthuman understanding, the naturalized material 
nonhuman other does not get recognized on a hierarchy, but rather, as one or the other.  
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The concept of the human being gets challenged because it does not get recognized as 
distinct, and as a result, is also deprivileged in Acker’s language. Annette-Carina van der  
Zaag discusses Braidotti’s contentions in this vein:   
In a postanthropocentric sense, in a deeply relational sense, our death is 
impersonal. Death is not a finite limit, but a porous threshold. For Braidotti, death 
is the inhuman inside all of us, and a fear of death is an all too human quality that 
binds us. Specifically, she argues that at the level of consciousness, death is that 
which we fear most, is already behind us. (334)   
In stating that death is “inhuman,” she condenses life down to its bios. The idea that death 
is “behind us” draws attention to its inevitability; thus, sentimentalizing death only 
assigns meaning to it that prevents us from prioritizing the life that precedes it and 
follows from it. Van der Zaag argues that this is a misstep in our considerations of life, 
for it privileges the human subject as opposed to bios itself. Similarly, the constraints 
placed within language, which opt for keeping the human privileged, gets relinquished by 
Acker and is used instead to find a sense of freedom that is extricable from the human. 
By using the practice of abortion, Acker subverts an idea that has been given unnecessary 
meaning, not only pointing to the finality of life and death, but the agency we have in 
how to construct it.   
  Furthermore, Acker’s text mirrors Braidotti’s posthuman contentions by 
expressing sexuality as a force beyond gender. Our author does this by distinguishing 
between the consciousness of adult and child. Instead of seeing sexuality through the 
conventional binary logic, which effectively subjects the individual, Acker’s text 
understands pure sexuality as a geography rather than another type of category. The 
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distinction made between adult and child is Acker’s way of reiterating the construction of 
the two, and the term adult itself as innately frivolous. This idea is demonstrated when 
Airplane discusses her grief upon being left by her boyfriend. She states:   
I became two people: I was (still) a child who wanted caring parents and I was a 
human I had made. The human I was making had a will as a god’s, like those 
gods in Norse mythology, cause the one I was making had to. The will isn’t 
ferocious or uncontrollable; it’s an adult. Whereas the child’s freedom in 
geographical terms is sexuality. That got me mixed up for a long time: being two 
people or rather, being the same person as a child and as an adult. And I knew I 
was hurting and I clung to my hurt. (Acker 149)   
A bifurcated split is administered within character in this narration: between the inherent 
child who still yearns for parental validation and the human, who is independent. Acker 
here replaces the child’s opposite, an adult, with the human. Her connotative splice is an 
important reminder to her reader that human is made, rather than naturally appearing. The 
speaker then goes on to note that the type of human being constructed had to fit within 
the constraints of a pre-made visual of the human, i.e. godlike akin to Norse mythology. 
This would be done not out of will, but because that type of construction was mandated 
by society. The will, as noted by the narrator, is an “adult” – not a characteristic of an 
adult, but the adult itself. This type of language demonstrates Acker’s belief that will and 
conscientiousness embody the adult in society, and everything else falls into the category 
of the child. Therefore, the adult in this context can read viewed as the Enlightenment 
subject. Acker even uses this splice between child and adult in the narrative within the “A 
Japanese Interlude”. This section interrupts Rimbaud’s chapter, and details the 
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destructive romance between the characters of Tomomori and Uneme. Tomomori says to 
his lover: “‘Half of you, Uneme, is a child who’s living in a world in which every 
person’s a monster.’ The child told him he was scared’ (47). In this dialogue, Acker 
shows that unfiltered emotion is derived from the “child” facet of one’s psyche, while the 
adult facet attempts to negate, repress, or intellectualize their emotions. Furthermore, the 
sexuality expressed in geographical terms, as exemplified by the quote, underscores the 
freedom of sexuality. To Acker, if the child represents the human in a pre-language state, 
and sexuality becomes the way in which one could locate the child proper, then sexuality 
here is meant to be understood as fundamentally raw and instinctual, as opposed to 
conditioned by language and sullied by social constructs.   
Acker’s obscene visuals of the flesh pollinate with her notions of sexuality in In 
Memoriam and call forth a posthuman recognition of both. The Japanese interlude 
underlines society’s inclination to perceive sexuality as solely tied to sex itself, and how 
this connection centralizes heteronormative desire and romance. In other words, a sexual 
heteronormative dynamic clearly situates the relationship between Tomomori and 
Uneme, as Tomomori is conventionally masculine and thus exudes masculine desire, 
while Uneme is feminine and passive towards her lover. As a result, sexuality functions 
simply as another marker of hierarchy and power difference. Following the title of the 
section, the narrator reveals that the story was written by a woman named Murasaki 
Shikibu, in A.D. 1008. This disclaimer suggests that the following narrative is seen 
through the female consciousness, and thus might play a considerable role in how the 
reader should conceptualize the narrative of the Japanese couple. Although this move 
suggests essentializing behavior, and thus contradicts what Acker would want, I posit that 
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her use of the female as narrator still works in seeing a way out of the gender binary. 
Female perspectives in In Memoriam, after all, are often spoken about in a position of 
submission to their masculine counterpart. But Shikibu’s own female perspective seems 
almost metacognitively aware of the reader’s likelihood to align the story with the female 
consciousness. As a result, Acker validates Shikibu’s indication that her own story is a 
“mental attitude”; in other words, she aware that it’s going to be read as female. Her story 
begins, “There is something vulgar, childish, and underdeveloped in the mental attitude 
revealed: a coarse greed for all experience, unlighted by the power to judge and reject or 
by any consciousness of the ranks and hierarchies” (43). What we should expect to see in 
the story that follows her claim is a relationship that understands sexual desire as 
liberated from logic and reason or a need to concede to a hierarchical structure. To the 
narrator, her story will illustrate characters who treat sexual passion as free of the nexus 
of political power, in addition to the difficult mental feat that one should experience. 
However, Acker’s narration informs the reader that, “Such passion is simultaneously 
childish and destructive” (43), which ultimately stresses that while the sexual passion is 
emotionally freeing, and bodily pleasurable, it does not align with the liberal conceits of 
conceptual humanism, nor will the passion foster constructive relationships.   
Finally, Acker internalizes the transversal facet of Braidotti’s posthumanism in 
the way she conceptualizes a type of continuous transformation of the human within her 
text. Her language parallels with Braidotti’s concept of “becoming-”. Braidotti titles this 
sensibility “feminist becoming-woman,” arguing that in a nomadic, or unpressured, 
evolving sense, “becoming-woman entails the evacuation or destitution of the socially 
constituted gendered identities (as molar formations), returning them to the virtual 
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multiplicity of chaosmic forces of becoming” (Braidotti 37). Through this, Braidotti calls 
forth a process of becoming that relinquishes gendered identities and opts for, instead, a 
kinetic mode of being. Acker, too, fosters this type of understanding of 
“becomingwoman” in the evolution of Airplane. “The Wild Palms” is interspersed with 
vignettes of a Faulknerian stream of consciousness (“men who are patriarchs either kill or 
maim by subverting their daughters. Every daughter has a father; every daughter might 
need a father” [220]). This employment acts as a displaced, patriarchal undercurrent, 
which runs through the conventional narrative. Airplane, in recognizing her own 
narrative’s  
Faulknerian undercurrent, comes to this abrupt realization about herself:    
Airplane had decided, after considering the facts of herself, that women don’t have 
shifting identities today, but rather they roam. She was talking, not exactly about 
Faulkner, but about her own self-destructiveness and strength. We are not dead 
pilots, she would say, but we don’t roam for the purposes of dying. Motorcycle 
hoods. If a man doesn’t fuck me where and when I want, he can get out. Of 
everywhere. (220).   
In understanding her gendered identity, Acker defines the liberation within Airplane’s 
identities as that which roams. This differentiates from the liberal belief that identities 
had to somehow overcome when met with adversity or conflict. Acker argues that to do 
so would mean to simply protect representation. Instead, Acker gives Airplane comfort in 
empowerment, achieved at Airplane’s “roaming” pace. Moreover, the action of roaming 
itself implies a slow negation of time as a relevant factor in the identity of the woman. In 
the woman understanding her means of self-destruction and strength through a sensibility 
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that seemingly counters strength, Airplane’s internal consciousness suggests a subversion 
of the strong woman that does not need to submit nor assign excess meaning to the 
woman within her flesh and being.    
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Chapter 3  
This final section will focus primarily on the spatial devices in Acker’s text, 
specifically in its misuse of punctuation marks and the posthuman consciousness that I 
argue underlies that misuse. Instead of serving to a clarify language, Acker’s punctuation 
marks oftentimes complicate the reader’s relationship to the words on the page and the 
message behind them. The following analysis defends using the critical framework of 
posthumanism as the primary way of digesting In Memoriam, as opposed to relying 
solely on the deconstructing methods of postmodern theory. First, I begin with a brief 
explanation about how some of these technical experiments seem postmodernist but are 
still emotionally divorced from this method of thinking. In other words, it might seem 
like Acker’s techniques are thoroughly postmodern, but seeing them through that 
framework will yield at best only a partial understanding of their effects. I argue that a 
reading of Acker is fragmented when not coupled with posthumanism. The motivation 
behind mentioning both theories begin with my reading of critic Ellen E. Berry, whose 
postmodern take of Acker’s bildungsroman, Blood and Guts in High School illustrates 
how leaving out the human is likely to happen when we think of Acker as strictly 
postmodern. In her essay, Berry first points out the conventions of postmodernism. She 
states that:   
Postmodern systems…function through a logic of simulation, hyper mimicry, and 
sign exchange and work in the realm of the negative, the absent… From this process 
of simulation and self-reference merges a culture of pure images, codes, and 
spectacles—a hyperreality more real than real – which material reality as such is 
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fundamentally irrecoverable so radically has it been subordinated to processes to 
technological reproduction. (52)   
Here, Berry informs her reader of the radical destabilization and meta-awareness inherent 
within postmodernism. Postmodern critique uses conventions such as repetition and self 
referential tactics to reconstruct or represent hyperreality in the language of a given text. 
A type of re-creation operates as a way to undo and denaturalize the material signifier –  
i.e. the text itself – from understanding it as a mirror on the world. In accepting this 
postmodern approach to Acker’s most recognized work, Blood and Guts in High School, 
Berry reads Acker’s text like an assertive deconstructionist, reading this book specifically 
through a feminist negative critique that counteracts Enlightenment ideology.4 In a typical 
postmodern fashion, she looks to a system of symbolism patterned within the text as a 
way to understand Acker’s work. As Berry states herself, her motive for illustrating the 
value of this postmodern critique is to figure how Acker’s symbolic systems, “[turn] 
against themselves…. expose their limits, and [are] so made vulnerable” (Berry 60). In 
other words, the critic looks at the ways in which the novel includes symbolic systems 
that are exposed for being constructed and not natural, and thus allows us to recognize the 
problem with all symbolic systems. However, my primary reason for writing this section 
is not because I don’t take Ellen Berry’s argument into consideration; rather, my response 
is related to my confusion at her statement directly said before the sentence quoted above. 
In it, she states, “I want to continue reading Blood and Guts in High School not to 
uncover its futural gestures toward potentially positive social spaces and transformative  
 
4 Through a feminist negative critique, Berry recognizes Acker’s goal as not to create a new system of 
language, per se, but rather, to mutilate the preexistent dominant structure that exists within language so as 
to accelerating its ruin within consciousness.   
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visions of the female subject” (60). This statement, I believe, wholly undercuts the 
gravitas of Kathy Acker’s life work. It does not consider the very human reason for 
Acker writing in the style she does – namely, to help us to empathize the marginalized 
subject and envision a world in which real empathy is possible. In isolating the 
postmodern approach, foregoing the human in language, and most egregiously, failing to 
prioritize the creation of these positive social spaces, Berry treats Acker’s work as though 
it was written for technical reasons only, without batting an eye towards real systematic 
change. In other words, by sidelining these ambitions that I see as essential to Acker’s 
work, Berry foregrounds the philosophical and technical aspects of her work at the cost of 
the human itself and its utopian potential. As reminded by Herbrechter in my opening 
section, relying on the material signifiers within Acker’s language fragments the human. 
Therefore, my own grievances against this move not only point to the limitations I see 
within Berry’s argument, and most postmodern readings for that matter, but justify the 
importance of prioritizing posthuman frameworks in reading of Acker’s work.  
The biggest advantage in applying a posthuman lens to Acker’s work is that it 
allows us to fully grasp not only her particular style—specifically, the defamiliarizing of 
punctuation—but helps us to recognize this misuse in such a way that discerns and 
empathizes with the marginalized lifeforce within the narrative itself. Posthumanism lets 
us locate something essential about Acker’s work that the bulk of postmodern readings 
have not been able to identify. Indeed, through Memoriam’s unreliable narration, 
narrative pluralism, and de-systematized punctuation vis-à-vis its misuse of quotation 
marks, brackets, and unsound arguments within her sentences, an Ackerian 
posthumanism seeps through. Similar to Berry, this section looks to how the haphazard 
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language of the text seeks to de-systematize the absurd and destructive nature of 
patriarchal consciousness. Moreover, this section takes inspiration from the French 
feminist critique of écriture féminine by trying to find the space that woman “resides” in 
within language itself. What French feminist critique sought to do with its subversive 
style, the posthumanism method of thinking actualizes. Though Acker’s techniques, 
references, and the years of her career seem to scream ‘postmodern,’ my reading of In 
Memoriam recognizes a way of radical destabilization that doesn’t try to hit reset on 
one’s way of thinking. As a result, this section embodies the posthumanist thought itself – 
one that acknowledges and divorces from past systems and doesn’t ruin them to start 
anew but offers a way of looking at language that prioritizes the living being. In short, I 
am arguing against the dominant tendency to engage in postmodern readings of In 
Memoriam and emphasizing the inherent and timely posthuman consciousness necessary 
in reading Acker’s language.   
To start, a convention within Acker’s language is the misuse of quotation marks, 
which serves to destabilize narration. Quotation marks, which are used within narratives 
to visually separate the prose and dialogue, get haphazardly used within the novel. As a 
result, the illustration of dialogue and narration confuse the reader insofar about who is 
talking or whether someone is talking at all. The quotations in In Memoriam do usually 
mark dialogue, but Acker also uses them as a means of conveying internal thought. For 
example, Airplane’s character, who is largely presented through dialogue and direct 
narration, is depicted in a scene where Airplane and her rapist are in his car, and in this 
scene, we see the play with punctuation. They are traveling to the urban outskirts, and 
Acker uses quotation marks to indicate Airplane’s thoughts: “‘I told my rapist I was 
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hungry. He started the car. Identity must be a house into which you can enter, lock the 
door, shut the windows forever against all storm. And so, we entered a city, its outskirts’” 
(118). Here, the quotation marks lead the reader to believe that Airplane is saying this 
aloud. However, the text itself suggests that she is thinking these sentences, rather than 
externalizing them. The reader is not given a clear relation to this character – we don’t 
know her relation to the narrator or to whom she’s speaking, so we don’t know who is 
quoting her or what is part of her narration of her experience nor what is reflected, or 
philosophized, on that diegetic experience. As a result, Airplane stands in for the narrator, 
which would normally be implied in a text that consistently keeps a first-person narration. 
But by using quotation marks, this line automatically segregates the narration that 
precedes Airplane’s dialogue and the rest of the narration. Paradoxically, Acker here is 
creating no distance between the diegesis of Airplane’s experience depicted here (moving 
in the car with the rapist), and the one that exists internally (her reflections on identity). In 
other words, the use of quotation marks in this context suggests that the words that are 
spoken aloud carry the same weight and should be read in the same way her internal 
dialogue. By quoting what Airplane’s own narration of what she said to her rapist (‘I told 
my rapist I was hungry), what was physically happening around Airplane while in the car 
(‘He started the car’, ‘we entered the city’) and her own philosophy (‘Identity must be a 
house into which you can enter’), the text garners a deeper sense of empathy for the 
deeply traumatic stress that Airplane undergoes. In using quotation marks this way, Acker 
embodies both the psychological and physical pain that Airplane feels in its entirety 
through a collapse of inner and outer worlds. Indeed, in this displacement of punctuation 
mechanics, marked by the play with mechanics that conventionally  
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prioritizes separation, a linguistic displacement of anthropocentric logic gets displaced 
itself. Through this misuse of quotation marks, the posthuman consciousness arises, one 
in which the human-nonhuman (in this case bodily and external environment) come to the 
fore and become consolidated by pervasive technological mediation (Braidotti 26). 
Indeed, this collision of technology (quotation marks as spatial devices) and the 
psychology of the Airplane during this moment, displace anthropocentric logic in the way 
that it underscores human pain felt not just by her, but through Acker’s characterless 
construction of a human. Which, as mentioned before, is not really a character at all.   
Furthermore, quotation marks get taken away in spots where there should be 
quotation marks. By stripping the typical markings of a quotation, Acker breaths a 
consciousness into the life of the prose. In a way, all narration should be considered 
dialogue. The narrator as storyteller is, quite obviously, telling a story. The convention of 
narratives dictates, however, that we don’t put quotes around narration. The technique 
that gets employed in Acker is a conventional postmodern move: free indirect discourse, 
which uses a 3rd person narrator and collapses the distance between narrator and character 
usually present in that style, ultimately adapting the thoughts and language of the 
character. In the narrative of Tomomori and Uneme, the narration gets toyed with in that 
the quotation marks vacillate between dialogue being said aloud and dialogue that is 
internal as well as dialogue between narrator and reader. At the end of their narrative, 
which again, interrupts the narrative of “R” and “V”, the character of Tomomori 
fantasizes about killing Uneme and the narrator relays to the reader his guilt for harboring 
this fantasy. While in his murderous fantasy, he is then catapulted to a phantasmic place 
that frightens him. However, the lack of quotations within this part of the text reverses  
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our conventional understanding of internal and external dialogue. Prior to Tomomori and 
Uneme’s narrative, Acker had used quotation marks in a nearly excessive manner in 
order to underscore its oppositional motivation—but it still showed when R and V were 
conversing. This switch in use speaks to the text’s unstable nature. As a result, the 
narration emerges as a dialogue both between narrator and audience and as well as the 
character with himself:  
   He had to get out of there. There was no one to rely on there. There was no  
  protection.   
   Why had he murdered?   
 Why had he taken her away with him when he knew that he didn’t care about 
her? It wasn’t that he hadn’t cared about her. He had never taken  
responsibility for his actions. Before this. After death. (54)   
Here, the text displays a series of rhetorical questions about the event that may have 
happened or may have happened in Tomomori’s fantasy. This place implied in the first 
sentence (“get out of there”) where Uneme feels trapped is a metaphor for him being 
riddled with the thoughts of confusion and guilt for having killed his lover in his fantasy. 
Upon reading this, the reader must note that this narration itself starts off conventionally; 
in an omniscient manner that presents the thoughts of the character in the narration itself. 
It works in conjunction with the character, but still maintains a space between itself and 
the space of the Tomomori. However, following this conventional narration is a series of 
rhetorical questions by this narrator, all of which imply that the narrator is representing 
Tomomori’s consciousness as it occurs to Tomomori. This consciousness is marked by 
its own capacity to not only question, but to rhetorically question the events that had just 
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happened before them. Moreover, this narration suggests that the narrator can be 
confused by the relationship between Tomomori and Uneme, in addition to relaying 
questions that Tomomori asks himself, and thereby can speculate why Tomomori could 
have possibly murdered his lover or not. This is implied in the fact that the narrative 
prose seems to both ask and answer its own question – even ending on a hyperbolic note 
that confirms the idea that they alone have established a dialogue with itself. Either that, 
or that the narrator begins to have a dialogue with themselves in a way we cannot, nor 
shouldn’t, follow. Braidotti’s multiple potentialities of the body emerge in this space.  
Through the text’s use of free indirect discourse, Acker collapses her own narration into 
Shikibu’s, and then again to Tomomori and Uneme’s. Even in playing with language and 
narration like methods of postmodernism would, she instills literary technique not 
specific to postmodernism. The lack of quotation marks in a place where there 
conventionally should be quotation marks – “someone”, after all, is talking – not only 
clarify Acker’s subversive, inconsistent depiction of dialogue or thought but speak to the 
narrative plurality that exists within the text and the posthuman undercutting of a binary 
logic.  
Indeed, the narrative plurality and free, indirect discourse mimic the conventions 
of postmodernism. Their destabilizing nature exploit the structure of language and 
narrative, which effectively reveals the transgressive nature to Acker’s work. However, if 
the reader were to couple this narrative transgression with the content of Acker’s work, 
therein lies the posthuman nature of text. Emilia Borowska, in her book The Politics of  
Kathy Acker, suggests a post-poststructuralist reading of Acker’s characterless (or to  
Borowska, “subject-less”) characters that overlaps with a posthuman ethos. She states:   
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It becomes apparent that Acker is looking for an open notion of the subject which, 
while remaining faithful to the poststructuralist disposal of a closed Cartesian ego, 
is more committed, responsible, self-willed, collective and active than the other 
poststructuralist models would allow. Further, her questing heroes are deniably 
drive by the pursuit of eternal values such as love, community and political 
emancipation, which suggests that their becoming a subject exceeds Sartrean  
‘being for-itself. (Borowska 210)   
Here, Borowska reads the Ackerian subject within In Memoriam as subversive, one that 
tosses away a patriarchal, Cartesian consciousness in hopes of exposing the marginalized 
figure. However, Borowska also points to the fact that there are human pursuits of these  
“characters” that establish a retentive call for our empathy, such as love and community. 
Because this pursuit is understood through the destabilized language, and not through 
centralizing a character, a renewed, posthuman method of thinking rises from our 
reading. In that way, a posthuman “deconstruction” is one that ensures our closing off of 
ego and opening up to collective understanding.   
  The vacillation between internal and external consciousnesses, again, demarcated 
by the misuse of quotation marks, is also illustrated in Airplane’s participation in a sex 
show. In centering this segment on sex, these scenes speak to the posthuman recognition 
as sexuality as a force beyond gender. The scenes relay the idea that sexuality should not 
be understood as it normatively has been – as constructed and subsequently categorized 
identities. Instead, it should be understood as it “pertains to the vital chaos, which is not 
chaotic but the boundless space of virtual possibilities for pleasure-prone affirmative 
relations” (Braidotti 37). In stating this, Braidotti calls us to read these scenes as a 
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disruption of patterns in which we usually sexualize the body. In this segment of the 
novel, Airplane publicly performs in sex show as a means of catharsis, albeit 
destructively, after ending her obsessive and abusive relationship with her rapist. What 
destabilizes our understanding of character is the fact that the narration fails to imply a 
reason for why she performs a sex show to begin with. This move is evidentially 
posthuman, in that we can read through the rhetorical play, but we are unable to further 
our understanding of Airplane’s individual psychology. Instead, we understand an event 
that would and should give rise our collective empathy for a person in her position. In this 
scene, the narration juxtaposes two sequential sex shows: one that could be read literally, 
in the way that it hyperbolizes the power dynamics of sex, and the other metaphorically, 
in the way that it reiterates the emotional aftermath of sex power dynamics and the 
consequences of them. The illustration of the sex shows first gets introduced as a 
performance, but one that plays into the heteronormative power differentials within sex 
(hence the identifiers of “Husband” and “Wife”), emphasizing an unequal power 
dynamic. Indeed, through this obscene, psychologically perturbing event and change of 
narrative register, the reader gains both an empathy and deeper understanding of the 
power-differential underpinnings of why woman is marginalized, in the addition to the 
intimacy needed in order to liberate her.    
Regarding this first narrative, it is important to remember that directly before the 
sex show, the narration states, “Later, I learned that his mother had been a drug addict” 
(116). This implicates a connection between that idea and the sex scene that follows. By 
placing this line and the scene of the sex show next to each other, the text suggests a 
connection between her rapist’s childhood and the sex show. The text uses a 
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psychological link between addiction in the household and the development of the child – 
in which case, turns them in violent and abusive adults – in order to disclaim a connection 
between that and the sex performance. This imagining, which uses a series of misused 
quotation marks and half opened parentheticals in its narration, sexualizes a woman’s 
troubling relationship with her husband:   
    ‘(Sex show:   
  ‘(Husband: Where are the rubbers?   
‘(His newlywed, very young wife, turning over in bed: What do you need rubbers 
for darling? It’s not raining.   
  ‘(Husband to himself: Dumb.   
  ‘(Husband: All right. Turn over, and I’ll teach you something. (Acker 116)  The 
reasons for headlining this scene with a sex show is a way for the narration to connect 
this scene with the sex show aftermath that follows. By using a colon in a conventional 
sense, in that it preemptively marks a defining or modifying qualify to the term or phrase 
prior to the colon, Acker is defining this as what makes up a sex show. She is saying here 
that her rapist’s childhood event foregrounds the psychological underpinnings of sex 
show itself. Therefore, the text here is using the colon to clarify its misuse, while still 
holding onto its conventional use, in addition to again missing quotation marks; this time 
as temporal separation, as opposed to a narrative separation. Additionally, the content 
here is important to remember. The sex depicted here underscores a power differential 
within a heterosexual relationship. Using the identities of “husband” and “wife”, which 
harkens back to the social, martial union, emphasizes the socially constructed difference 
between them. Indeed, the crude and vulgar nature of their performance, and thus the 
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attention towards the marginalized subject, gets read through both this first scene, and the 
connection to the next, which again, is understood through the language’s spatial devices.    
The demarcated sex show that “occurs” subsequent to this performance is no 
longer focused on an active sex show. Again, this scene misuses punctuation and 
quotation marks to both subversively distinguish the text as prose, and not dialogue, in 
addition to harken back to the previous, metaphorical sex show. In this scene, which is 
separated by a catapult back to real time between Airplane and her rapist, the text informs 
us that a sex show is occurring continuously. By leading in with the sentence “Sex 
show.”, the narration informs the reader of an indirect relation to the sex show and 
precludes the collective empathy felt by Airplane and the other sex performers. The text 
reads:   
“Sex show. The point is that the smell of sex is everywhere. Whether or not you do 
it. It lies on the skin and it’s in the air in the mouth… Here, the women don’t need feminism 
to allow them to curl around each other like cats, or to put their heads on each other’s 
shoulders for consolation, or to hold hands…. They are women whose legs are 
automatically spread open and to whom men can do anything.  Anything can go into any 
hole. But these women smell particularly, of sex.”  (55)  Like mentioned in my second 
chapter, this scene exhibits the collective intimacy felt by these women who presumably 
participate in the sex show. However, its structural relation to a similar event in the 
narrative reiterates the posthuman ethos that underlies it. Instead of treating the text that 
follows the term “Sex show” as though the event itself is occurring at the given moment of 
narration, the text describes the emotional aftermath of the sex show on the individuals, 
particularly the women, who are participating in the event. The text here does not feature 
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the literal scenes from the sex show because Acker is interested on what the effects of the 
event are on the woman. In order to do so, Acker illustrates the empathy of the women that 
occupy this space and uses the provocative setting of a sex show as a place that necessitates 
such collective empathy. In describing the “smell of sex” as pervasive, Acker is bringing 
us into the physical setting of the scene and suggesting the way that sex exists as a social 
milieu of the space itself. The reader can distinguish “sex” as the backdrop of the scene in 
Acker’s reiteration that it, sex, still lingers “Whether or not [one does] it.” This once again 
draws attention to Acker’s subversion of the period as punctuation. We know that a sex 
show has happened, but we know that vicariously through its aftermath. Indeed, the internal 
dialogue that is quoted, either by the narrator or Airplane, is Acker’s way of displacing a 
narrative consciousness; the porousness of the registers of narration unifies both internal 
and external dialogue, in addition to morphing together the consciousness of the narrator 
and the character.  
Furthermore, Acker still creates a distance between these two sex scenes through 
an in-between narration. The reason for providing narration between the sex scenes is to 
not only reiterate a separation between the events but to reinform the reader of multiple 
temporal realities that exist within the text. Again, the text shares an interdependence 
with multiple others (Braidotti 39). In this case, sexuality gets revealed through plural 
narrations. Normally, narratives call forth a type of transition between scenes, all the 
while implying that there is a temporal or causal relation between them. However, Acker 
subverts this notion. In this space between sex scenes, the narration conveys a switch in 
location, marked by a dialogue between Airplane and her rapist (115-6). Still in the car, 
the rapist stops the vehicle outside the urban centers, suggesting that they are now in an 
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urban district after a long journey. This is separated in the way the parentheticals end, and 
the focus returns to Airplane and her rapist in the car for a few paragraphs, then back to 
the sex show in another parenthetical. We are thus not given a clear sense of when the sex 
show occurs in relation to the time in the car or in relation to the actual rape. In between 
the sex shows, the rapist says to Airplane, “‘Look at yourself. Look at yourself.’”. 
Airplane responds, but internally: “I don’t want to look. He held the back of my neck in 
his fingers and turned it to the car mirror. My mouth was open. You only look when you 
care what you see.” (117). Compare this to the description of the scene a few pages prior: 
“After he had raped her, the tall thin man carried the girl out the barn, into some sort of 
car, that moved by an engine, and she didn’t fight him. She even seemed to cling to him” 
(114). This scene, which appears prior to the second sex show, confirms the fact that 
Airplane and rapist are driving at a separate time than the sex show or after the rape, thus 
spatially and temporally stabilizing the narrative. More notably, the scene justifies the 
reason for Airplane’s imagined justification of her rapist’s own trauma, in addition to 
contextualizing both the need for a setting in which women must congregate in order to 
empathize and heal from their collective traumas.  
  Finally, by looking to the improper causal relations within sentences, Acker’s 
language speaks back to the Braidotti posthuman feminist call to practice 
defamiliarization as a key methodological tool. In the way proper use of punctuation is 
set up to support logical relations in order to engender comprehension, posthumanism 
subversively demands that we first, evolve a new frame of reference and more 
significantly, become relational in a complex and multidirectional manner. As Braidotti 
argues, doing so would disengage the language from dominant models of subject 
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formation, and by extension, dominant and oppressive institutions (Braidotti 30). Acker 
does this through her language. Indeed, moments of logical but unsound narrative 
movement, which maintain their sense through causal relationality, are prevalent in In  
Memoriam, to which Braidotti would argue are relayed through its rhetorical nonsense. 
For example, this occurs when Rimbaud, whose own narration is haphazardly set against 
the backdrop of World War II, tells a bike gang about German men’s ferocious means of 
killing. He says that, “All men, being men, are cruel and minimal; the Germans, being 
conscious of their cruelty, thus confident of their decisions and lack of decisions, were 
crueler” (17). Literally, the claim is split three ways. First, the text argues that all men, 
because they are men, are cruel and minimal. Second, the men’s confidence in their 
decision-making is predicated on their awareness of that cruelty. Thirdly, the behavior of 
these men was crueler because the men were aware of their cruelty. There is a logical 
disjunction between the cause and effect of these claims. Sensibly speaking, men are not 
cruel and minimal just because of their gender. Awareness of one’s cruel attributes does 
not automate confidence. There is no clear explanation as to why cruelty would beget 
cruelty in this instance. Nonetheless, a narrative still gets constructed through these series 
of sentences, even though it is told in a defamiliarizing manner.  The “trajectory” of R, 
for example, draws a series of logical links but they’re not actually logical, narrative, or 
coherent. The reader can still pick up a critique on men, and their penchant for cruelty 
once aware of their power to be cruel. Indeed, in recognizing the posthuman call to 
comprehend language through a new frame of reference, Acker’s lack of proper causal 
relation gives rise to type of coherence that is dramatically separated from dominant 
structures.   
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Conclusion  
My reason for a posthuman reading of Kathy Acker’s In Memoriam to Identity is 
a personal one. Why shouldn’t it be? After all, I identify, at least in part, as the 
marginalized subject whose identity diametrically opposes the conceptual Man, or the 
normative subject our society remains centered around. What that means is that I am 
categorized within the group of social individuals whose oppression Acker wishes to lend 
credence to, and therefore validate, within her subversive, destabilizing text. For this 
reason alone, the stakes of her writing involve me and other marginalized figures alike. 
Who else would Acker be writing for, if not the living individual themself, and all the 
trauma that comes from existing on a lower tier of the individual hierarchical reality? 
Through my analysis, I wished to clarify that posthumanism, a method of thinking that 
argues for the consideration of all bios, makes the most sense if we are to undo the deeply 
embedded patriarchal logic that pervades our consciousness and language. Because the 
very concept of the human was constructed with the means of maintaining a standardized, 
binary way of thinking, then we must undo the Enlightenment associations with the 
human and all its implicative tendencies in order to see an actual way out of it. Undo, 
however, should not be mistaken with forget. The deconstructive methods in my readings 
still highlight the mechanics needed to patriarchal thought in language, but the 
maintenance of the human must be come to the fore of our reading. A reader of Acker’s 
should ask themselves, “Where does empathy reside?” and not, “How can I understand 
this for the sake of understanding this?”. Quite simply, we must see past our current 
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understanding and maintenance of the humanism, and the logical sensibilities that are 
coupled with it, if we are to ever liberate the marginalized subject.   
By analyzing Acker’s In Memoriam, a novel whose very essence aligns with the 
écriture féminine writer’s way of subverting patriarchal language, I, too, am breathing life 
into the woman in language. However, I purport to do so in a way that does not 
concentrate on the woman as she’s been conceptualized through language. I do not wish 
to reinscribe her into a binary existence, and I am really not interested in seeing the 
woman solely reimagined within fictional narrative and theoretical discourse. My 
opposition to this limitation is the reason why I find it significant to clarify the 
inappropriateness of using theories such as postmodernism in order to understand Acker’s 
text. Simply put, the problem with using postmodernism is that despite its efforts to 
deconstruct the material form of language in order to clarify seemingly impenetrable 
texts, postmodernism ultimately prioritizes the male-centered consciousness. For 
instance, if Acker’s approach to sex was seen only through a postmodern lens, the reading 
would sacrifice the isolated bodily pleasure that Acker wishes to maintain. One does not 
intellectualize sex within the act, so why one-dimensionalize it within language? The 
intellectualizing habit of postmodernism runs dialectical circles around a sensation that is 
impossible to fully explain. Because the posthuman considers a relational ontology that 
begins with the body, in addition to considering the historical underpinnings of sex, 
sexuality, and desire, the theory can simultaneously support Acker’s narration and call 
attention to sex itself and the pleasure that underlies it.   
Moreover, posthumanism emphasizes the need for optimal fulfillment of what it 
means to be a living being, whereas postmodern cynicism leaves the living individual 
  38  
nothing but circular deconstruction. Understanding this, I argue that Acker’s text lacks a 
complete or consistent understanding of its own language. This posthuman impossibility 
emphasizes that its primary focus is indeed, empathy. Her text is her iteration of 
empowering the living being, and all of those who suffer under the weight of the 
patriarchal consciousness because of structural categories and logic. Do the obscenities 
and vulgarity pushed to the forefront of Acker’s narrative only exist in theory? Do sexual 
assault, male-inflicted abuse, and violence attached to sex only lie on a plain of 
theoretical discourse? The discomfort in recognizing that they, in fact, do not, and instead 
are real things that happen to real people, is the reason to consider the human outside of 
language and therefore oppose the theoretical drive of postmodernism and 
deconstruction. The marginalized subject is a life on the spectrum of bios who is actually 
at stake and at the mercy of patriarchy. By rejecting coherent narrative language, Acker is 
truly dislodging the anthropocentric mentality that presents comprehensibility as 
inherently male and salvages a utopianism of bios both inside and outside her narrative.   
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